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Substantiating "Competitive Disadvantage" Claims: A Broad 
Reading of Truitt 
. Since 1945, the United States has experienced a steady decline in 
unionization. 1 However, despite their decreasing ranks, labor unions 
maintain a significant role in determining the wages and working con-
ditions of American workers,2 making the collective bargaining pro-
cess important to both union and nonunion employees. 
The recession of the early 1980s forced a number oflabor unions to 
accept lower wages in order to preserve job security.3 This concession 
bargaining reflected, in part, a trend toward greater cooperation be-
tween employers and labor unions in an effort to improve productiv-
ity. 4 An integral component of this cooperation was the sharing of 
information traditionally held only by employers. 5 
The duty of an employer to provide information to its employees' 
labor union is indirectly derived from the language of the National 
Labor Relations Act (NLRA).6 Sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d) of the 
NLRA require an employer and its employees' bargaining representa-
tive (the union) to bargain in good faith.7 Both the National Labor 
1. Between 1945 and 1982 union membership as a percentage of nonagricultural employment 
declined from 35.5% to 17.9%. See D.S. HAMERMESH & A. REES, THE ECONOMICS OF WORK 
AND PAY 205 (3d ed. 1984) (Table 9.1) (1945 figure) [hereinafter HAMERMESH]; BUREAU OF 
NATL. AFFAIRS, INC., DIRECTORY OF U.S. LABOR ORGANIZATIONS 1984-85 EDITION 2 (1984) 
(1982 figure). 
2. For example, in 1980, although union membership as a percentage of nonagricultural em· 
ployment was only 21.9%, approximately 40% of all blue-collar workers and approximately 
18% of all white-collar workers had their wages and working conditions subject to collective 
bargaining. HAMERMESH, supra note l, at 205, 209 (Tables 9.1 & 9.3). Furthermore, collective 
bargaining agreements often directly affect the wages of nonunion employees because nonunion 
employers will raise their wages in response to increased wages won by unions to reduce the 
likelihood that their employees will unionize. Indeed, nonunion employers will often match the 
union wage in order to retain the benefits of a nonunion work force. Additionally, nonunion 
employers may be forced to raise wages to union levels in a tight labor market in order to com-
pete with union employers in recruiting workers. Id. at 251. 
3. D. ROTHSCHILD, L. MERRIFIELD & C. CRAVER, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND LABOR 
ARBITRATION 40-41 (3d ed. 1988) [hereinafter ROTHSCHILD]. See also infra notes 126-30 and 
accompanying text. 
4. See R. SMITH, L. MERRlFIELD, T. ST. ANTOINE & c. CRAVER, LABOR RELATIONS LAW 
46 (7th ed. 1984) [hereinafter SMITH]. 
5. For example, in a contract negotiated by the United Auto Workers (UAW) and Chrysler 
in 1981, Chrysler agreed to provide the UAW with monthly financial information that was previ· 
ously only assembled for the benefit of Chrysler's board of directors. Other employers made 
similar information-sharing agreements with their employees. ROTHSCHILD, supra note 3, at 43, 
49 n.54. 
6. 29 u.s.c. §§ 151-69 (1982). 
7. Section 8(a)(5) reads in part: "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer .•. (5) 
to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees .•.• " 29 U.S.C. 
§ 158(a)(5) (1982). 
Section 8(d) reads in part: 
2026 
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Relations Board (NLRB) and the federal judiciary have interpreted 
the concept of good faith bargaining to create an affirmative obligation 
on the part of employers to provide unions with vari.ous kinds of infor-
mation upon request. 8 This obligation is rooted in the idea that a 
union needs certain information to perform its section 9(a) bargaining 
duties properly.9 
In general, disclosure is required when the requested information 
is "relevant" to the bargaining process.10 When the information con-
cerns wage data, 11 the information is treated as presumptively rele-
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual 
obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable 
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions 
of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and 
the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by 
either party, but such obligation does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or 
require the making of a concession .... 
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1982) (emphasis added). 
The concept of good faith bargaining is discussed in Part III infra. 
8. For example, in Aluminum Ore Co. v. NLRB, 131 F.2d 485, 487 (7th Cir. 1942), the 
Seventh Circuit stated that the "expressed social and economic purposes" of the NLRA required 
the employer to disclose information relating to the wage history of its employees to the union. 
See also infra notes 10-18 and accompanying text. 
The obligation to supply information to unions runs throughout the life of the collective 
bargaining agreement as well as during negotiations. NLRB v. Acme Indus. Co., 385 U.S. 432, 
436 (1967). 
While the Act an imposes equal disclosure obligation on both the employer and the union, 
most of the case law concerns the employer's obligation. 
9. See, e.g., In re Aluminum Ore Co., 39 N.L.R.B. 1286, enforced, 131 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 
1942); In re Sherwin-Williams Co., 34 N.L.R.B. 651 (1941), enforced, 130 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 
1942); In re Pioneer Pearl Button Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 837 (1936); see also Bartosic & Hartley, The 
Employer's Duty to Supply Information to the Union-A Study of the Interplay of Administrative 
and Judicial Rationalization, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 23, 24 (1972) [hereinafter Bartosic]. 
Section 9(a) reads in part: 
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the 
majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive 
representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in 
respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment .•.. 
29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982). 
10. The test for relevancy is that the information requested by the union must be necessary 
for it to bargain intelligently over specific issues raised during negotiations. See Acme, 385 U.S. 
at 435-36. See also infra notes 113-16 and accompanying text. 
The term "relevant" is a misnomer to some scholars. See Bartosic, supra note 9, at 41 (con-
tending that "[o]nly when 'relevant' is read to mean 'necessary' does the case rhetoric comport 
with the underlying rationale"). It appears that "relevancy" is merely a legal label. For exam-
ple, in Acme, the Supreme Court described an employer's disclosure obligation to require the 
disclosure of "needed" information but then later referred to the question as a "relevancy" deter-
mination. 385 U.S. at 435-36. 
11. "Wage data" has been broadly defined by the courts. See Bartosic, supra note 9, at 28, 
30-35. The term includes time study data (NLRB v. Otis Elevator Co., 208 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 
1953)), job rates and classifications (Taylor Forge & Pipe Works v. NLRB, 234 F.2d 227 (7th 
Cir. 1956)), merit increases (Otis Elevator Co., 170 N.L.R.B. 395 (1968)), pension data (Electric 
Furnace Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1077 (1962)), incentive earnings (In re Dixie Mfg. Co., 79 N.L.R.B. 
645 (1948), enforced, 180 F.2d 173 (6th Cir. 1950)), group insurance data (Stowe-Woodward, 
Inc., 123 N.L.R.B. 287 (1959)), and factors used in recommending merit increases (International 
Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. NLRB, 382 F.2d 366 (3d Cir. 1967)). 
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vant12 and must be disclosed upon request. With respect to nonwage-
related data, however, a union must demonstrate the relevancy of the 
information.13 The disclosure rule governing financial and manage-
ment-related information14 was established in NLRB v. Truitt Manu-
facturing Co. 15 The Truitt Court articulated the "substantiation 
doctrine,"16 which requires an employer to substantiate its claims that 
put in issue the employer's capacity to pay a particular wage de-
mand.17 Truitt is widely considered the primary case regarding an 
employer's good faith duty to provide unions with information. 18 
During collective bargaining negotiations, an employer can put its 
economic capacity to pay in issue by making several responses; how-
ever, each response may have its own legal consequence. The most 
direct response is the "inability-to-pay" claim where the employer 
flatly asserts that it cannot afford to pay the union"s wage demand. 19 
Less directly, economic capacity claims are often couched in ambigu-
ous terms of competition. These claims may take the form of an em-
ployer contending that it would be operating at a "competitive 
disadvantage" relative to its competitors if it were to meet the union's 
wage demand. 20 
12. See Boston Herald-Traveler Corp., 110 N.L.R.B. 2097 (1954), enforced, 223 F.2d 58 (!st 
Cir. 1955); Whitin Mach. Works, 108 N.L.R.B. 1537, enforced, 217 F.2d 593 (4th Cir. 1954), 
cert. denied, 349 U.S. 905 (1955); In re Yawman & Erbe Mfg. Co., 89 N.L.R.B. 881 (1950), 
enforced, 187 F.2d 947 (2d Cir. 1951). 
13. See, e.g., International Woodworkers, Local Unions 6-7 & 6-122 v. NLRB, 263 F.2d 483, 
485 (D.C. Cir. 1959) (distinguishing presumptively relevant wage data from sales data, which the 
court considered irrelevant given the particular facts of the case). 
14. Management-related information includes an employer's assessment of the company's 
health, detailed production and sales data, information about products and inventory, techniques 
and processes used by the employer, long-range forecasts of growth or contraction, and detailed 
breakdowns of the employer's financial posture (expanding the financial reports ordinarily avail-
able to shareholders). Shedlin, Regulation of Disclosure of Economic and Financial Data and the 
Impact on the American System of Labor-Management Relations, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 441, 445-46 
(1980). 
15. 351 U.S. 149 (1956). 
16. This expression was coined by Florian Bartosic and Roger C. Hartley. See Bartosic, 
supra note 9, at 23; see also infra section I.A. 
17. See Teleprompter Corp. v. NLRB, 570 F.2d 4 (1st Cir. 1977); Empire Terminal Ware-
house Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 1359 (1965), ajfd .. 355 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Caster Mold & 
Mach. Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 1614 (1964); Pine Indus. Relations Comm., Inc., 118 N.L.R.B. 1055 
(1957). 
This Note will use the term "wage demand" to encompass not only hourly wages and sala-
ries, but also anything that would be deemed a labor cost by an employer (e.g., health insurance 
and vacation time). 
18. See SMITH, supra note 4, at 547 (presenting Truitt as the primary case in its discussion of 
the employer's good faith obligation to supply unions with information); see also Bartosic, supra 
note 9, at 43 (describing Truitt as the "landmark information decision"); Miller, Employer's Duty 
to Furnish Economic Data to Unions- Revisited, 17 LAB. L.J. 272, 275 (1966) (also describing 
Truitt as a "landmark decision"). 
19. See, e.g., Truitt, 351 U.S. at 150 ("The company answered that it could not afford to pay 
such an increase .... "); see also infra section I.B.1. 
20. See infra sections l.B.2 & 3. 
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Although both employer responses are distinct because they may 
describe different financial situations,21 they both convey a message to 
the union that the employer may experience economic harm which 
could affect its financial position adversely and; accordingly, jeopar-
dize the welfare of the employees.22 Both claims leave a union in the 
same quandary: should it press its wage demand or replace it with a 
lesser one? Without more information about the employer's financial 
situation and capacity to pay, a union cannot effectively decide the 
proper course of action and, concomitantly, execute its section 9(a) 
duties.23 
The case law applying the Truitt disclosure principle is in a state of 
discordance. Some courts have read Truitt narrowly and have ruled 
that only when an employer asserts an inability to pay a particular 
wage demand has it placed its economic capacity to pay in issue to the 
extent that disclosure of substantiating financial information is re-
quired. 24 Other courts have loosely interpreted inability-to-pay claims 
and have ruled that competitive disadvantage claims are tantamount 
to inability-to-pay claims.25 Finally, some courts have read Truitt 
broadly and have ruled that the tenets of good faith bargaining require 
21. See NLRB v. Harvstone Mfg. Corp., 785 F.2d 570, 577 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 
U.S. 821 (1987) {footnote omitted): 
While it is axiomatic that [an employer cannot operate at a competitive disadvantage] ... 
indefinitely, it does not preclude a finding that, at least for the term of the new collective 
bargaining agreement, the employer operating at a competitive disadvantage is financially 
able, although perhaps unwilling, to pay increased wages. In such a case, we think that the 
employer's claim of competitive disadvantage is not a plea of an inability to pay. 
See infra notes 107-09 and accompanying text. 
22. For instance, in Harvstone, 785 F.2d at 570, although the employers who were seeking 
concessions never said they could not pay the current wages, a letter sent by two of the employers 
to their employees asserted that the wages paid by them were higher than those of their competi· 
tors, and warned that "if we are going to continue ... as a strong competing employer ... we 
must have a relief from this intolerable situation." 785 F.2d at 584 (second ellipsis in original). 
During the negotiations the employers' bargaining representative asserted that the employers 
needed relief from labor costs "to stay in business." 785 F.2d at 583. See infra part IV.A. 
23. See Shedlin, supra note 14, at 447. 
24. See Washington Materials, Inc. v. NLRB, 803 F.2d 1333, 1338 (4th Cir. 1986) ("'At no 
time did the Respondents assert they were unable to pay what was required under the union 
contract proposals but rather consistently maintained they wanted to obtain a more competitive 
position in the industry. The Respondents thus had no Truitt obligation to provide the Union 
with all their financial records ... .'")(quoting NLRB ruling); Harvstone, 785 F.2d at 575-76; 
United Fire Proof Warehouse Co. v. NLRB, 356 F.2d 494, 498 (7th Cir. 1966); Advertisers Mfg. 
Co., 275 N.L.R.B. 100 (1985); ACL Corp., 271 N.L.R.B. 1600, 1601 (1984); Metlox Mfg. Co., 
153 N.L.R.B. 1388, 1394-96 (1965); Empire Terminal Warehouse Co., 151 N.L.R.B. 1359, 1360 
(1965), ajfd. sub nom. Dallas Gen. Drivers, Local No. 745 v. NLRB, 355 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 
1966); Caster Mold & Mach. Co., 148 N.L.R.B. 1614 (1964); Taylor Foundry Co., 141 N.L.R.B. 
765, 766·67 (1963), enforced, 338 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1964); see also infra section I.B.1. 
25. See New-York Printing Pressmen & Offset Workers Union No. 51, 538 F.2d 496, 500 (2d 
Cir. 1976) (The employer ambiguously contended that it "couldn't reach" the proposed wage 
and "maintain a 'proper balance.'"); NLRB v. Palomar Corp., 465 F.2d 731, 734 (5th Cir. 
1972); NLRB v. Bagel Bakers Council, 434 F.2d 884, 887-88 {2d Cir. 1970); United Steelworkers 
v. NLRB, 401 F.2d 434, 436 (D.C. Cir 1968); Mashkin Freight Lines, Inc., 272 N.L.R.B. 427, 
435 (1984); Hiney Printing Co., 262 N.L.R.B. 157, 157 (1982); Hiatt Gen., Inc., 257 N.L.R.B. 
960, 965 (1981), enforced without opinion, 685 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1982); Wheeling Pac. Co., 151 
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that competitive disadvantage claims, as well as other claims, be sub-
stantiated by appropriate financial information.26 
This Note argues that the broad reading of Truitt is correct. It 
advocates a broad rule which would require an employer to disclose 
substantiating financial information27 to its employees' union when-
ever it claims that meeting a proposed wage demand would place the 
firm at a competitive disadvantage.28 Because the appropriateness of 
substantiating financial information is factually dependent, this Note 
will not focus on the type or amount of information that should be 
disclosed.29 Instead, it will focus on the legal and policy justifications 
for a broad disclosure rule. Part I reviews Truitt and discusses the 
various interpretations given to it by lower courts and the NLRB. 
Part II examines some economic concepts and demonstrates that full 
disclosure of financial information is crucial when evaluating employer 
bargaining claims made in response to union wage demands. Part III 
argues that the concept of good faith bargaining as espoused by the 
Supreme Court and the "relevancy" test support a broad disclosure 
obligation. Part IV discusses the advantages of a broad disclosure rule 
that would inure to the benefit of employers, employees, the NLRB, 
the judiciary, and society. 
I. THE DUTY To SUPPLY INFORMATION 
A. Truitt: The ''Substantiation Doctrine" 
The primary disclosure case in the context of collective bargaining 
is Truitt. The question in Truitt was whether the NLRB could find 
that an employer was bargaining in bad faith when the employer 
N.L.R.B. 1192, 1193 (1965); Cincinnati Cordage & Paper Co., 141 N.L.R.B. 72, 77 (1963); see 
also infra section l.B.2. 
26. See K-Mart Corp. v. NLRB, 626 F.2d 704, 707-08 (9th Cir. 1980); General Elec. Co. v. 
NLRB, 466 F.2d 1177, 1183-84 (6th Cir. 1972); NLRB v. General Elec. Co., 418 F.2d 736, 750-
52 (2d Cir. 1969); General Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 918, 922-23 (4th Cir. 1969); Puerto Rico 
Tel. Co. v. NLRB, 359 F.2d 983, 986 (1st Cir. 1966); NLRB v. Western Wirebound Box Co., 356 
F.2d 88, 91-92 (9th Cir. 1966); see also infra section I.B.3; Miller, supra note 18, at 278. 
27. The term "financial information" is intended to encompass management-related informa-
tion described in note 14 supra. 
28. The phrase "competitive disadvantage" is intended to encompass all employer claims 
that suggest the employer would incur some form of cognizable financial or competitive injury if 
it were to meet a particular wage demand. Competitive disadvantage claims are often used by 
employers to spurn union wage demands because such claims are perceived as not triggering a 
disclosure obligation. See, e.g., Washington Materials, 803 F.2d 1333; Harvstone, 185 F.2d 570; 
Western Wirebound, 356 F.2d 88. 
29. Generally, substantiation requires the disclosure of as much information as the union 
"reasonably requires in order meaningfully to evaluate the employer's claim of a financial inabil-
ity to pay." Teleprompter Corp. v. NLRB, 570 F.2d 4, 11 n.3 (1st Cir. 1977). Examples of 
substantiating financial information include: an audit of payroll records and books, the original 
records and books, cancelled checks, check stubs, quarterly payroll records, as well as the man-
agement-related information discussed in note 14supra. See J. O'REILLY, UNIONS' RIGHTS TO 
COMPANY INFORMATION 54-55 (rev. ed. 1987). 
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claimed that it could not afford to pay higher wages demanded by the 
union and refused to give the union information which would substan-
tiate its claim. 30 In particular, the employer responded to the union's 
request for a wage increase of ten cents per hour with the claim that it 
could not afford to pay the increase.31 Further, the employer refused 
to produce any evidence substantiating the claims, stating that "the 
information . . . is not pertinent to this discussion and the company 
declines to give you such information; You have no legal right to 
such."32 
On these facts, the NLRB found that the employer had failed to 
bargain in good faith in violation of section 8(a)(5) and ordered the 
employer to supply the union with information that would "substanti-
ate [its] position of its economic inability to pay the requested wage 
increase."33 On appeal, the Fourth Circuit refused to enforce the or-
der, holding that good faith bargaining required only a sinqere desire 
to reach an agreement and not the disclosure of information respecting 
"matters which lie within the province of management .... "34 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Fourth 
Circuit. The Court ordered the employer to "substantiate [its] claim 
of inability to pay increased wages. " 35 The Court predicated its hold-
ing on section 204(a)(l) of the NLRA, which requires management 
and unions to "exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain 
agreements concerning rates of pay, hours, and working conditions . 
• • • "
36 The Court reasoned: 
Good faith bargaining necessarily requires that claims made by either 
bargainer should be honest claims. This is true about an asserted inabil-
ity to pay an increase in wages. If such an argument is important 
enough to present in the give and take of bargaining, it 'is important 
enough to require some sort of proof of its accuracy. And it would cer-
tainly not be farfetched for a trier of fact to reach the conclusion that 
bargaining lacks good faith when an employer mechanically repeats a 
claim of inability to pay without making the slightest effort to substanti-
ate the claim. 37 
The Truitt Court limited this principle, however, by refusing to 
establish a per se rule requiring substantiation of all inability-to-pay 
claims. The Court endorsed, instead, a case-by-case approach where 
30. 351 U.S. at 150. 
31. The employer also claimed that it was undercapitalized and that it had never paid divi-
dends. 351 U.S. at 150. For a more thorough discussion of the facts, see NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. 
Co., 224 F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1955), revel., 351 U.S. 149 (1956). 
32. 351 U.S. at 150-51 (ellipsis in original) (quoting employer communication to union). 
33. 351 U.S. at 151 (quoting order of NLRB). 
34. 224 F.2d at 874. 
35. 351 U.S. at 153. 
36. 29 U.S.C. § 174(a)(l) (1982). 
37. 351 U.S. at 152-53. 
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"[t]he inquiry must always be whether or not under the circumstances 
of the particular case the statutory obligation to bargain in good faith 
has been met."38 
Although the Truitt Court did not make reference to section 9(a) 
of the Act or rely on any of the "relevant" information cases,39 it is 
unclear whether the Court intended to establish an entirely separate 
basis for a disclosure obligation. The Court commented that "both the 
union and the company treated the company's ability to pay increased 
wages as highly relevant."40 Consequently, it is unclear whether a 
substantiation obligation exists independent of a relevancy inquiry;41 a 
merger of the concepts is evident in lower court opinions. 42 Whatever 
the doctrinal reason, it is apparent that Truitt established that good 
faith bargaining requires an employer to substantiate some economic 
claims made to a union. 
• B. The Lower Courts' Applications of Truitt 
to Different Employer Claims 
As discussed earlier, 43 employers respond to union wage demands 
in various ways. Employers do not always take an absolute inability-
to-pay stance, as did the employer in Truitt; instead, they often couch 
their responses in terms of competition or economic harm. This sec-
tion reviews three disparate ways the NLRB and the lower courts have 
applied Truitt to competitive disadvantage claims. 
38. 351 U.S. at 153-54. But see Teleprompter Corp. v. NLRB, 570 F.2d 4, 9 n.2 (1st Cir. 
1977) (explaining that despite this limitation, Truitt has, for all practical purposes, become an 
automatic rule with respect to inability-to-pay claims). See also infra notes 95-98 and accompa-
nying text. 
39. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text. 
40. 351 U.S. at 152. 
41. See Bartosic, supra note 9, at 43; see also J. O'REILLY, supra note 29, at 49 (contending 
that Truitt established a substantiation obligation where "(n]o prior showing of relevance is nec-
essary"); see also infra notes 110-12 and accompanying text. 
42. For example, in NLRB v. Celotex Corp., 364 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1966), the court, in 
enforcing the NLRB's order requiring an employer to disclose financial information, rested its 
ruling entirely on a relevancy determination, analogizing it to the relevancy standard in discov-
ery proceedings. The court stated that 
[t]he rule governing disclosure of [financial] data ... is not unlike that prevailing in discov-
ery procedures under modern codes. There the information must be disclosed unless it 
plainly appears irrelevant. Any less lenient rule in labor disputes would greatly hamper the 
bargaining process, for it is virtually impossible to tell in advance whether the requested 
data will be relevant except in those infrequent instances in which the inquiry is patently 
outside the bargaining issue. 
364 F.2d at 554 (quoting NLRB v. Yawman & Erbe Mfg. Co., 187 F.2d 947, 949 (2d Cir. 1951)); 
see also Puerto Rico Tel. Co. v. NLRB, 359 F.2d 983, 986-87 (1st Cir. 1966); General Elec. Co., 
173 N.L.R.B. 164 (1968), enforced, 414 F.2d 918 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1005 
(1970); Fafnir Bearing Co., 146 N.L.R.B. 1582 (1964), enforced, 362 F.2d 716 (2d Cir. 1966); 
GORMAN, LABOR LAW 413-14 (1976) (contending that the employer's assertion of poverty 
makes the substantiating financial information relevant). 
43. See supra notes 19-23 and accompanying text. 
June 1989] Note - Competitive Disadvantage Claims 2033 
1. Truitt Limited to its Facts 
Universally, Truitt is regarded as having established the rule that a 
company must generally disclose substantiating financial data when-
ever it claims an inability to pay a union's proposed wage or benefit.44 
Several courts, and at times the NLRB, have limited Truitt to this 
principle.45 
NLRB v. Harvstone Manufai:turing Corp. 46 serves as a recent ex-
ample of a narrow application of Truitt. Harvstone involved four com-
panies seeking wage and benefit concessions from their employees' 
union. The companies claimed that they were operating at a competi-
tive disadvantage relative to their nonunion competitors in other parts 
of the United States. To substantiate this claim, the companies pre-
pared and disclosed a schedule comparing the wages paid by their 
competitors to their own labor costs. However, the union wanted 
more - it requested the companies' financial records to substantiate 
their economic problems. The companies responded that they did not 
have to release their financial records because they were not claiming 
an inability to pay.47 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
cited Truitt to pronounce the "well-established" rule "that when an 
employer makes a claim of financial inability to pay a proposed wage 
rate, it generally has an obligation, in order to meet its duty to bargain 
in good faith, to provide substantiating financial data to its employees' 
bargaining representative upon request."48 
The court further stated that the relevant test was "to ascertain 
whether the employer said it 'would not' as opposed to 'could not' pay 
the employees' proposed demands."49 "Only in the latter situation[,]" 
the court continued, "where the employer communicated that it 
'could not' pay the demands has [the employer] made a claim of in-
ability to pay."50 After reviewing the record, the court agreed with 
the NLRB's finding that one of the four companies pleaded an inabil-
ity to pay.51 However, with respect to the other three companies the 
44. See Washington Materials, Inc. v. NLRB, 803 F.2d 1333, 1338 (4th Cir. 1986); NLRB v. 
Harvstone Mfg. Corp., 785 F.2d 570, 579 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 821 (1987); 
NLRB v. Billion Motors, Inc., 700 F.2d 454 (8th Cir. 1983); Western Mass. Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 
573 F.2d 101 (1st Cir. 1978); NLRB v. Pacific Grinding Wheel Co., 572 F.2d 1343 (9th Cir. 
1978); New York Printing Pressmen & Offset Workers Union No. 51 v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 496 (2d 
Cir. 1976); NLRB v. Rybold Heater Co., 408 F.2d 888 (6th Cir. 1969); International Tel. & Tel. 
Corp. v. NLRB, 382 F.2d 366 (3d Cir. 1967); Dallas Gen. Drivers, Local Union No. 745 v. 
NLRB, 355 F.2d 842 (D.C. Cir. 1966); NLRB v. Taylor, 338 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1964). 
45. See supra note 24 and cases cited therein; see also Huston, Furnishing Information as an 
Element of the Employer's Good Faith Bargaining, 35.U. DET. L.J. 471, 486 (1958). 
46. 785 F.2d 570 (7th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 821 (1987). 
47. 785 F.2d at 573. 
48. 785 F.2d at 575. 
49. 785 F.2d at 575. 
50. 785 F.2d at 576. 
51. 785 F.2d at 576. 
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court reversed the NLRB because it interpreted the companies' com-
petitive disadvantage response as implying an unwillingness rather 
that an inability to pay the union's wage demand.s2 Accordingly, the 
court held that the three companies had not bargained in bad faith 
when they refused to furnish the requested financial data.s3 
In reaching this holding, the Harvstone court explicitly rejected the 
notion that a claim of competitive disadvantage was tantamount to a 
claim of inability to pay or that such a claim would trigger a disclosure 
obligation under Truitt. s4 
2. The "Competitive Disadvantage" Claim Interpreted as an 
Inability-to-Pay Claim 
In contrast, other courts, and at times the NLRB, have broadly 
construed inability-to-pay claims to encompass employer objections 
couched in terms of competition or other vague economic terms.ss 
This loose definition is demonstrated in United Steelworkers v. 
NLRB. s6 In this case, the employer stated that it "didn't see how [it] 
could remain competitive" if it increased employee wages. s7 It refused 
to disclose economic data requested by the union on the ground that it 
did not claim an inability to pay. The employer asserted that a claim 
of inability to pay was not made when it claimed that an increase in 
wages would prevent it from competing. The Court of Appeals for the 
D.C. Circuit disagreed, reasoning that 
the inability to compete is merely the explanation of the reason why the 
Company could not afford an economic benefit. In Truitt, for instance, 
the case from which the short-hand expression "inability to pay" is de-
rived, the employer's claim was that "an increase of more than 2 1/2 
cents per hour would put it out of business."S8 
The NLRB used similar reasoning in Wheeling Pacific Co., s9 where 
the employer refused to grant the union's proposed wage increase on 
the ground that it had to in order to remain competitive. The com-
pany in Wheeling contended that, because it was not pleading an in-
ability to pay, under Truitt, it was not required to disclose the data. 
52. 785 F.2d at 576. 
53. 785 F.2d at 577. 
54. "[T]he mere assertion by an employer that it is operating at a competitive disadvantage 
does not, in and of itself, constitute a claim of inability to pay." 785 F.2d at 575. 
55. See supra note 25 and cases cited therein. 
56. 401 F.2d 434 (D.C. Cir. 1968). 
57. 401 F.2d at 436 (quoting testimony of company's negotiator). Arguably, when this lan-
guage is coupled with the company's other claim to the employees that the money ·~ust wasn't 
there," 401 F.2d at 436, the employer was asserting an inability to pay. See Harvstone, 785 F.2d 
at 575 n.4. However, the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit did not find it to be an explicit 
"inability-to-pay" claim. 401 F.2d at 436. 
58. 401 F.2d at 436 (quoting Truitt, 351 U.S. at 150). 
59. 151 N.L.R.B. 1192 (1965). 
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The NLRB disagreed, finding the argument self-contradictory. The 
Board reasoned that if granting economic benefits would have the ef-
fect of reducing the company's competitiveness, it followed that the 
company was asserting its financial inability to grant the economic 
benefits. 60 The Board stated that the "basic principles which under-
lay Truitt cannot be considered less relevant merely because [the com-
pany] . . . expressed the view that wage increases would ultimately 
lead to poverty, rather than that such increases were precluded by pres-
ent poverty."61 
Although this approach loosely interprets an inability-to-pay claim 
to encompass a claim of competitive disadvantage, it still requires that 
the employer's claim be interpretable as an inability-to-pay claim. The 
next section discusses cases applying Truitt where the courts and the 
NLRB have given Truitt a broader reading. 
3. Truitt Applied Beyond Its Facts: The Broad Rule 
Several courts, and in some cases the NLRB, have applied the 
Truitt principle beyond its factual situation and have adopted a broad 
application of Truitt. 62 These cases focus on the proposition stated in 
Truitt that "[g]ood-faith bargaining necessarily requires that claims 
... be honest" and "require[s] some sort of proof of [their] accu-
racy."63 Thus, for a number of courts, the nature of the employer's 
claim is irrelevant; the important principle is that an employer must 
prove what it claims. 64 
In NLRB v. Western Wirebound Box Co., 65 as in United Steelwork-
ers and Wheeling Pacific Co., the Truitt principle was extended to 
cover an employer's claim of competitive disadvantage. The employer 
in Western Wirebound claimed that its employees needed to accept a 
wage reduction in order for the company to maintain a competitive 
position. The employer explicitly stated "that he was not saying that 
the company was unable to pay the wage increase demanded."66 In 
response to this "competition" claim, the union requested certain 
figures relating to productivity, labor and material costs, and price 
changes, and the opportunity to hire an accountant to look at the em-
ployer's books.67 The Ninth Circuit's rationale for enforcing the 
60. 151 N.L.R.B. at 1225 (NLRB adopting the report of the Trial Examiner). 
61. 151 N.L.R.B. at 1225 (emphasis in original). This reasoning was rejected in Harvstone, 
785 F.2d at 577 n.6; see infra notes 107-09 and accompanying text. 
62. See supra note 26 and cases cited therein. 
63. 351 U.S. at 152-53. 
64. See generally Miller, Employer's Duty to Furnish Economic Data to Unions - Revisited, 
17 LAB. L.J. 272 (1966). 
65. 356 F.2d 88 (9th Cir. 1966). 
66. 356 F.2d at 89. 
67. 356 F.2d at 89. 
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NLRB's order directing the company to release the data did not rest, 
however, on the notion that a claim of competitive disadvantage was 
tantamount to a claim of inability to pay. Rather, the court relied on a 
broad reading of Truitt and ruled that the company's failure to pro-
duce data which would have substantiated its competitive disadvan-
tage claim was bad faith bargaining. The court stated: 
[T]he principle announced in Truitt is not confined to cases where the 
employer's claim is that he is unable to pay the wages demanded by the 
union. That sort of claim, rather, was held to be covered by the stated 
broad principles that good faith bargaining necessarily requires that 
claims made by either bargainer should be honest claims, and that if an 
argument is important enough to present during bargaining sessions, it is 
important enough to require substantiation. 
We see no reason why, under the [Truitt] rationale, an employer who 
insistently asserts that competitive disadvantage precludes him from ac-
quiescing in a union wage demand, does not have a like duty to come 
forward, on request, with some substantiation. In both cases, the give-
and-take of collective bargaining is hampered and rendered ineffectual 
when an employer mechanically repeats his claim but makes no effort to 
produce substantiating data. In one case as well as the other this sort of 
conduct runs counter to section 204(a)(l) of the Act ... which admon-
ishes both employers and employees to "exert every reasonable effort to 
make and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, hours, and 
working conditions."68 
The broad Truitt rule has been applied to compel substantiation of 
various claims made by employers outside of the inability-to-pay con-
text. For example, in General Electric Co. v. NLRB, 69 the employer 
claimed that its offered wage rates were competitive in the local area 
but refused to release the correlated wage data upon which this asser-
tion was based. The Sixth Circuit cited Truitt and ruled that General 
Electric had to disclose the data. Noting that the Truitt rationale was 
not confined to its facts, 70 the court stated: 
When the company takes the position that its wage rates are competitive 
in the local areas and has taken wage surveys of the local areas, which 
presumably would back up the Company's position, then it is only rea-
sonable that the Union should be given sufficient data to determine 
whether the Company's position is accurate and justified. 71 
Later, reemphasizing its use of the Truitt principle, the court pro-
claimed that "[t]he employer must be ready to back up its wage claims 
with factual proof which affords the Union an opportunity to fairly 
understand the merits of the employer's position."72 
68. 356 F.2d at 90-91 (citation omitted). 
69. 466 F.2d 1177 (6th Cir. 1972). 
70. 466 F.2d at 1184 (citing Western Wirebound, 356 F.2d at 90-91). 
71. 466 F.2d at 1184. 
72. 466 F.2d at 1184. 
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Additionally, the broad Truitt principle has been applied to compel 
the disclosure of cost information for proposed benefits when the em-
ployer has asserted that the benefits were simply too costly.73 An em-
ployer's claim that layoffs were for economic re~sons was ruled to 
require that the employer prove the economic reasons existed.74 The 
Fourth Circuit ordered an employer to allow the union to conduct 
independent time studies to substantiate data upon which the em-
ployer claimed its hourly rates were based. 75 In a similar vein, the 
Ninth Circuit required the disclosure of wage scales paid by an em-
ployer in other communities to substantiate the employer's claim that 
it had a policy of paying wages commensurate' 'with local wage 
standards. 76 
In summary, the case law applying Truitt presents three disparate 
approaches to employer competitive disadvantage claims in response 
to union wage demands: (1) only inability-to-pay claims must be sub-
stantiated; (2) in addition to inability-to-pay claims, competitive disad-
vantage claims must be substantiated because they are tantamount to 
inability-to-pay claims; and (3) all competitive disadvantage claims 
made by an employer must be substantiated, regardless of whether 
they are interpretable as inability-to-pay claims. Arguably, all three of 
the approaches are plausible interpretations of Truitt; however, as the 
subsequent sections will show, given the importance of financial infor-
mation when evaluating competitive disadvantage claims, the doctrine 
of good faith bargaining supports the third approach's broad rule. 
The next section will demonstrate the importance of financial informa-
tion when evaluating an employer's ability to pay a particular wage 
demand. 
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION WHEN 
EVALUATING COMPETITIVE DISADVANTAGE CLAIMS 
Before discussing the policies and legal doctrines that undergird an 
employer's disclosure obligation, a brief discussion about the impor-
73. See NLRB v. General Elec. Co., 418 F.2d 736, 752 (2d Cir. 1969) ("GE's oftbanded 
refusal to submit information on [the cost] issue which it had itself raised ... amount[s] to an 
unfair labor practice"). 
74. Puerto Rico Tel. Co. v. NLRB, 359 F.2d 983, 986-87 (1st Cir. 1966). In this case the 
court merged the concepts of relevancy and substantiation by ruling that the economic data were 
relevant because the union wanted the compa11y to prove that the economic reasons which the 
company raised existed. 
75. General Elec. Co. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 918, 925 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 
1005 (1970) ("The data collected by General Electric [were] that which it relied on, in part, to set 
hourly rates. General Electric claimed that based upon [these] data the employees involved in 
wage grievances were not underpaid. Under such circumstances, it was incumbent on General 
Electric under § 8(a}(5) of the Act to disclose proof of the accuracy of its position.") (emphasis 
added). See Bartosic, supra note 9, at 48-49. 
76. K-Mart Corp. v. NLRB, 626 F.2d 704 (9th Cir. 1980) (citing General Elec. Co. v. 
NLRB, 466 F.2d 1177 (6th Cir. 1972)). 
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tance of complete financial information during collective bargaining is 
appropriate. This section will demonstrate that an employer's bare 
assertion that meeting a proposed wage demand will cause it economic 
or competitive harm is meaningless to a union unless the assertion is 
buttressed by appropriate financial information besides profit and loss 
data. 77 The discussion first examines the economic implications of a 
competitive disadvantage claim and then identifies two of the claim's 
implicit assumptions. Then, the importance of financial information 
will be shown by demonstrating that the veracity of the two assump-
tions and, thus, the veracity of the competitive disadvantage claim, 
can be proved only by resort to the employer's financial information. 
The first step in appreciating the importance of financial informa-
tion to a union when it is evaluating an employer's competitive disad-
vantage claim is to grasp the economic implications of the claim. 
Assuming a profit maximizing motivation, an employer's collective 
bargaining stance (as well as all of its decisions) in response to a 
union's wage demand turns on the employer's determination of how 
meeting the demand would affect its net profit. 78 Such an employer, 
when rejecting a wage demand, is implicitly communicating to the 
union that meeting the wage demand would result in a net profit below 
a desirable level. Specifically, the employer is saying that it cannot 
pass the cost of the wage demand on to its customers in the form of a 
price increase, absorb the cost as an additional operating cost, or em-
ploy a combination of both, and still maintain a desirable profit level. 
There are at least two significant implicit assumptions in such a 
claim. First, the claim assumes that an increase in the price of the 
employer's product will cause a significant decrease in sales. Other-
wise, the employer possibly would be able to pass on the cost of the 
wage demand to its customers and not suffer a lower net profit. Sec-
ond, the claim assumes that the demand for the employer's product 
will remain the same. If this were not the case and demand were to 
increase, then the employer would experience higher sales and net 
profits, creating the possibility for it to pay the wage demand without 
compromising its current profit level. Thus, both of these assumptions 
are essential to the veracity of the employer's implicit claim. Testing 
77. Of course the current and past profit and loss data of an employer are useful to test 
whether the employer currently has sufficient funds to meet a wage demand and also suggest how 
the employer's business may do in the future. However, there are other forms of financial infor· 
mation that management uses to predict how its business will be in the future which are very 
helpful when evaluating competitive disadvantage claims. See supra note 14. 
78. Economists commonly assume that profit maximization is the primary aim of business 
enterprises. A profit maximizing firm is concerned with choosing the right level of output to 
produce, buying the right mix of inputs, and keeping production as efficient as possible. R. MAIN 
& c. BAIRD, ELEMENTS OF MICROECONOMICS 172 (2d ed. 1981) [hereinafter MAIN]; W. SHEP· 
HERD, A. PUTALLUZ & W.H. ANDERSON, MICROECONOMICS 20 {1983) [hereinafter 
SHEPHERD]. 
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these assumptions is where financial information plays an important 
role. 
The first assumption can be tested by examining the price elasticity 
of product demand for the employer's product. Price elasticity of 
product demand is an economic statistic which measures the respon-
siveness of consumers to changes in the price of a product. 79 A low 
elasticity means that a change in price will not have a dramatic effect 
on the quantity demanded for that product, while a high elasticity 
means that a change in price will significantly affect the quantity de-
manded for that product. so 
79. MAIN, supra note 78, at 71-74; R. MILLER & R. MEINERS, INTERMEDIATE 
MICROECONOMICS 105 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter MICROECONOMICS]; SHEPHERD, supra note 78, 
at 63-67. 
80. Price elasticity of product demand is computed by talcing the absolute value of the per-
centage change in quantity demanded divided by the percentage change in price: 
Price elasticity = % & Q I % & P 
This is simply a ratio between a cause and an effect. The cause is the change in price and the 
effect is the consumers' change in how much of the product they want. For example, take the 
following demand curves: 
2.50 
§: 2.00 
c: 
~ 1.50 co 
.. 
& 
8 
·c: 1.00 c. 
.50 
0 
0 
Figure 1 
5 10 13.5 
Various quantity responses 
Quantity (1000 gallons per week) 
Demand 
curve I 
15 20 
The change in price for both curve I and curve II is from $1.50 to $2.00 causing corresponding 
changes in the quantity demanded. Since elasticity will be different at different points on the 
demand curve, the midpoint of each quantity range is used by economists as the reference quan-
tity when computing the percentage change in quantity. The price elasticity of product demand 
for curve I from point A to point B is 
% & QI% & P = 1-1,500/14,250 I .50/$1.75 I= l-10.53/28.57 I= .367 
The price elasticity of product demand for curve II from point A to point C is 
1-1,500/12,500 I .50/$1.75 I = 1-12.00/28.57 I = .420 
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Knowing the elasticity of an employer's product is very important 
when testing the first assumption and, thus, evaluating an employer's 
competitive disadvantage claim .. The employer, when making a com-
petitive injury claim, is implicitly contending that the increase in 
wages will force it to raise prices, resulting in lower sales and profits. 
However, the severity of this loss turns on the elasticity of the product. 
If the product has a low price elasticity of demand, then the drop in 
sales (all other things being equal) would be insignificant, allowing the 
employer to maintain current profit levels. Conversely, if the product 
has a high price elasticity of demand, the wage increase ultimately 
would have a negative effect on the employer's profits. In any event, 
market studies, indicating the elasticity of an employer's product, 
would be of great use to the union in testing an employer's competitive 
disadvantage claim. 81 
The second assumption - that the demand for the employer's 
product will remain the same - also requires financial information to 
test its veracity. Basic microeconomics informs us that when the de-
mand for a firm's product increases82 the firm can sell more of its 
product at a higher price, resulting in a higher net profit for the firm. 83 
Thus, at the given price range, a firm with demand curve I would experience a lower loss of sales 
than a firm with demand curve II as the result of the same price increase. See SHEPHERD, supra 
note 78, at 62-66. 
Primarily, the determining factor of a product's price elasticity of demand is the extent to 
which other products can be substituted for it. A product with many substitutes will have a 
relatively elastic demand, because, all other things being equal, consumers will opt for cheaper 
substitutes. On the other hand, a product with few substitutes will have a relatively inelastic 
demand. See MAIN, supra note 78, at 58-60; MICROECONOMICS, supra note 79, at 166-69; SHEP· 
HERD, supra note 78, at 67. 
81. This discussion of price elasticity of product demand has assumed that labor cost is a 
significant cost for the employer. For example, for a labor-intensive employer, labor may be 70% 
of its total cost. On the other hand, for a capital-intensive employer, labor cost may only consti-
tute 30% of total cost. For the labor-intensive firm, a change in wages will affect its total cost 
more than the same change in wages would for the capital-intensive firm. Thus, the extent to 
which price elasticity of product demand analysis is pertinent to a discussion of the effect of a 
wage increase on an employer's total cost depends on the significance of an employer's labor cost 
relative to its total cost. , 
The significance of labor cost to an employer is another example of information that would be 
valuable to a union when evaluating an employer's competitive disadvantage claim, because if 
labor is a small component of the employer's cost then an increase in wages may have a nominal 
effect on the final cost of the employer's product. See MAIN, supra note 78, at 82-85; 
MICROECONOMICS, supra note 79, at 476-81; SHEPHERD, supra note 78, at 311-13. 
82. It is important to distinguish the term "change in demand" from the term "change in the 
quantity demanded." The former, intended here, refers to a shift in a firm's entire demand func-
tion, meaning that at every price more of the product will be demanded. The latter term refers to 
the different quantities demanded along a firm's cost function, depending on the market price of 
the product. MAIN, supra note 78, at 54. 
83. Compromising some detail, this can be explained briefly. First, the laws of supply and 
demand dictate that an increase in demand for a firm's product will result in a higher quantity 
demanded at a higher price. SHEPHERD, supra note 78, at 80. The increase in price that the firm 
can charge provides the firm with higher profits. This profit is represented by area A in Figure 2. 
Additionally, since the firm will want to produce at the profit maximizing output, it will follow 
microeconomic principles and increase its production to an output where the marginal cost of 
producing the last unit of output is equal to the revenue (the price) it receives for the last unit. 
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So, for example, if an employer forecasts an increase in demand for its 
product, then the employer also should predict a higher net profit 
from which it possibly could pay the union's wage demand and still 
maintain a desirable profit level. Moreover, a firm may have excess 
production capacity which would allow it to produce more output at a 
lower per unit cost, resulting in a higher net profit. 84 Thus, when eval-
Marginal cost (MC) is the change in a firm's total cost when it produces one additional unit of 
output. Because a profit maximizing firm never would want to produce a unit if the production 
cost of that unit exceeded the revenue that could be received for it, but would want to produce a 
unit if the revenue received exceeded the production cost of the unit, the firm would want to 
produce at an output where marginal cost equals marginal revenue. This output is represented 
by Ql in Figure 2. The profit received by a firm from the sales of the increased production is 
represented by area B of Figure 2. 
dollars 
Figure 2 
MC 
For a more thorough microeconomic analysis, see MAIN, supra note 78; MICROECONOMICS, 
supra note 79; SHEPHERD, supra note 78. 
Of course, most firms do not plot their cost curves to guide their economic behavior. Rather, 
the cost curves and the profit maximization rules describe how successful firms tend to act. E. 
BROWNING & J. BROWNING, MICROECONOMIC THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 229 (2d ed. 1986). 
84. Consider, for example, a tool and die shop that is underusing its production apacity 
because it has not received enough job orders. If the shop receives more job orders it can fill 
them by using its extra production capacity. Assuming that we are in the short run, the only 
additional costs the shop would incur to fill the new orders would be operating costs such as 
labor, raw materials, and energy. Economists call these costs variable costs because as a firm's 
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uating the credibility of an employer's competitive disadvantage claim, 
it is crucial to examine the employer's assessment of its future, and 
this can only be done by reference to the information upon which the 
employer bases its claim, which generally comprises sales forecasts, 
marketing studies, production capacity studies, and other relevant 
studies about the future of the employer's business. 85 
output varies these costs vary accordingly. Indeed, if a firm shuts down it will not incur these 
costs at all. The variable costs of a firm can be divided by the units of output to derive the firm's 
Average Variable Cost ("AVC"). AVC first decreases and then increases as output increases. 
This phenomenon is explained by the physical realities of production. For instance, if it takes X 
number of workers to produce Y units of production, it does not necessarily follow that it will 
take 2X number of workers to produce 2Y units of production. This is because an additional 
worker may augment productivity by performing services that were previously performed by her 
coworkers, allowing the coworkers to produce more than they previously did. For example, 
suppose the shop's only variable cost is its labor cost and its costs are reflected in Table I: 
Production (units) 
25 
50 
100 
200 
250 
Table 1 
Variable Cost($) 
225 
400 
700 
1000 
1200 
AVC ($/unit) 
9.0 
8.0 
7.0 
5.0 
4.8 
MAIN, supra note 78, at 133. Its total labor cost when producing 100 units is $700. However, 
because of additional production capacity the shop can double its production to 200 units but 
experience only a 43% increase in labor cost (($1000 - $700) I $700). Thus, the AVC decreases 
from 7 (700/100) to 5 (1000/200). This reduction of AVC will continue until production crowd· 
ing becomes a problem. Because there is a fixed amount of plant space, machines, and tools in 
the short run, as more workers are hired the productivity (output per worker) eventually must 
decline. MAIN, supra note 78, at 132. Referring to Table 2, suppose that with one worker the 
shop can produce 20 units a shift. If another worker is added the various tasks can be divided up 
allowing the shop to produce 35 units. Likewise, a third worker allows the shop to produce 4S 
units a shift and produce 50 units with a fourth worker. Notice that the addition of each worker 
increases the shop's capacity less than the addition of the previous worker: 
No. of Workers 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Table 2 
Capacity 
20 
35 
45 
50 
Marginal Difference 
20 
15 
10 
5 
SHEPHERD, supra note 78, at 158. Although more is produced, output per worker declines, so 
operating costs per unit of output (the AVC) increases. This phenomenon is called the law of 
diminishing marginal returns. Main, supra note 78, at 83-84; MICROECONOMICS, supra note 79, 
at 245-51; SHEPHERD, supra 78, at 157-58. 
Thus, the cost of producing a firm's product varies with the quantity of its output. More 
specifically, in some circumstances a firm can increase production and experience a drop in the 
cost of production per unit of output. Thus, information relating to business forecasts, produc-
tion capacity, as well as loss/profit statements, would be helpful in determining whether an em-
ployer has the capacity to pay increased wages without experiencing higher costs per unit of 
output. 
85. See supra note 14. 
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This basic discussion does not purport to explore thoroughly the 
field of economics or present all forms of important financial informa-
tion, but it demonstrates the need for financial information when eval-
uating an employer's competitive disadvantage claim. The disclosure 
of appropriate financial information to a union would allow it to un-
derstand satisfactorily the employer's financial situation which gave 
rise to the employer's reluctance to pay increased wages or, in some 
cases, would equip the union with the information necessary to 
demonstrate the falsity or spuriousness of the employer's claim. A 
union's need for financial information when evaluating competitive 
disadvantage claims is relevant to the concept of "good faith" bargain-
ing, which requires that a union be provided with information needed 
to perform properly its section 9(a) bargaining duties. 86 The next sec-
tion will demonstrate that good faith bargaining as defined by the 
NLRB and the judiciary supports the broad disclosure rule articulated 
in Western Wirebound Box Co., 87 which requires an employer to fur-
nish a union with appropriate financial information to substantiate 
competitive disadvantage claims. 
III. THE CONCEPT OF GOOD FAITH BARGAINING 
Given the importance of financial data when evaluating employers' 
competitive disadvantage claims, the broad interpretation of Truitt 
comports with the basic notion of good faith bargaining. The concept 
of "good faith" was imported to the law of collective bargaining in 
order to assure a high quality of labor negotiations. 88 The duty to 
bargain in good faith is an "obligation ... to participate actively in the 
deliberations so as to indicate a present intention to find a basis for 
agreement .... " 89 
In theory, determining whether a party is bargaining in good faith 
is a subjective test where the inquiry is whether an employer has "an 
open mind and a sincere desire to reach an agreement."90 However, 
because in reality the employer's state of mind can only be determined 
86. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text. 
87. 356 F.2d 88 (9th Cir. 1966); see supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text. 
88. Cox, The Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1401, 1413 (1958). 
Although § 8(d), which contains the "good faith" expression, was not added to the NLRA until 
1947, the NLRB and the courts had previously imposed a good faith requirement on collective 
bargainers. See, e.g. NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676, 684 (9th Cir. 1943); 
NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 118 F.2d 874, 885 (1st Cir.), cerL denied, 313 U.S. 595 (1941); 
NLRB v. Boss Mfg. Co., 118 F.2d 187, 189 (7th Cir. 1941) ("Collective bargaining requires that 
the parties involved deal with each other with an open and fair mind and sincerely endeavor to 
overcome obstacles or difficulties existing between the employer and the employees •... "); Globe 
Cotton Mills v. NLRB, 103 F.2d 91, 94 (5th Cir. 1939) ("[T]here is a duty on both sides, though 
difficult of legal enforcement, to enter into discussion with an open and fair mind, and a sincere 
purpose to find a basis of agreement .... "). 
89. Montgomery Ward, 133 F.2d at 686. 
90. 133 F.2d at 686. 
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by inference from the employer's conduct during negotiations, the case 
law has established objective criteria for determining what is bad faith 
bargaining in violation of sections 8(a)(5) and 8(d).91 As a result, the 
courts and the NLRB focus on the parties' conduct during the negoti-
ations when making a good faith determination.92 This leads to the 
incongruous result of the NLRB and the courts regulating the manner 
in which collective bargaining is conducted regardless of the actor's 
actual state of mind.93 However, in order to facilitate resolution of 
bargaining disputes, reality must compromise theory: 
In every case, the basic question is whether the employer acted like a 
[person] with a mind closed against agreement with the union. The 
[NLRB] can judge [the employer's] subjective state of mind only by ask-
ing whether a normal employer, willing to agree with a labor union, 
would have followed the same course of action.94 
The Truitt Court, wary of creating an inflexible per se rule of con-
duct, limited its holding by saying that "[e]ach case must tum upon its 
particular facts."95 Nevertheless, the dissenters in Truitt were critical 
of the majority's opinion because they thought that the bad faith deter-
mination was based only on the employer's refusal to substantiate its 
inability-to-pay claim. The dissenters contended that in any case 
where good faith was in issue the "totality of the conduct of the nego-
tiation" must be considered.96 Because such an inquiry had not been 
made, the dissenters concluded that the case should be returned to the 
NLRB for a good faith determination under the totality of conduct 
standard.97 Despite the dissenters' admonitions and the majority's 
limitation, the case law applying Truitt demonstrates that an em-
ployer's refusal to substantiate an inability-to-pay claim has become 
objective evidence of per se bad faith bargaining.98 
91. See GORMAN, supra note 42, at 409 ("Although the [Truitt] Court has rejected a rule 
which would automatically result in a finding of bad-faith bargaining .•• the Board and the 
courts have over time developed a number of principles which facilitate an assessment in advance 
of the employer's duty to disclose different kinds of information."). 
92. Cox, supra note 88, at 1430. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. at 1419; see NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 747 (1962) ("[T)he Board is authorized to 
order the cessation of behavior which is in effect a refusal to negotiate, or which directly ob-
structs or inhibits the actual process of discussion, or which reflects a cast of mind against reach-
ing agreement.") (emphasis in original). 
95. 351 U.S. at 153. 
96. 351 U.S. at 155. 
97. 351 U.S. at 157. 
98. See Cox, supra note 88, at 1430 (describing Truitt as a per se case); see also Teleprompter 
Corp. v. NLRB, 570 F.2d 4, 9 n.2 (1st Cir. 1977); New York Printing Pressmen & Offset Work-
ers Union No. 51 v. NLRB, 538 F.2d 496, 500-01 (2d Cir. 1976); C-B Buick v. NLRB, 506 F.2d 
1086, 1091 (3d Cir. 1974); NLRB v. Palomar Corp., 465 F.2d 731, 734 (5th Cir. 1972); NLRB v. 
Bagel Bakers Council, 434 F.2d 884, 888 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 908 (1971); NLRB 
v. Southland Cork Co., 342 F.2d 702, 706 (4th Cir. 1965). But see International Woodworkers, 
Local Unions 6-7 & 6-122 v. NLRB, 263 F.2d 483 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Taylor Forge & Pipe Works 
v. NLRB, 234 F.2d 227 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 942 (1956). 
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NLRB v. Jacobs Manufacturing Co., 99 cited with approval by the 
Truitt majority, 100 also demonstrates the application of the good faith 
bargaining test in the context of an employer's refusal to substantiate 
its inability-to-pay claim. In Jacobs, the employer took the position 
that it was unable to raise wages because business conditions made it 
financially unable to do so. The employer refused the union's request 
to examine the employer's books and sales records to prove to the 
union that the company was not able to increase wages. The company 
subsequently refused to meet with the union unless the union submit-
ted a new written proposal. The Second Circuit ruled that the em-
ployer had bargained in bad faith when it refused to meet with the . 
union and when it refused to substantiate its economic claim. The 
Jacobs court defined good faith bargaining to require "cooperation in 
the give and taJce of personal conferences with a willingness to let ulti-
mate decision follow a fair opportunity for the presentation of perti-
nent facts and arguments."101 The court continued that "[t]his ... 
was not satisfied by ... the bare assertion of a conclusion made upon 
facts undisclosed and unavailable to the union which wa~ not accepta-
ble. without a presentation of sufficient underlying facts to show, at 
least, that the conclusion was reached in good faith." 102 
The thrust of the Jacobs decision was that the employer was re-
quired to show via disclosure that it had in good faith reached a deci-
sion that it could not meet union demands. The court was evidently 
not concerned with the actual reasons the employer did not want to 
open its books. Rather, the court seemed to expound that good faith 
bargaining inherently requires substantiation of economic incapacity 
claims regardless of the bargainer's actual subjective intent. 103 
99. 196 F.2d 680 (2d Cir. 1952). 
100. 351 U.S. at 153 n.6. 
101. 196 F.2d at 683. 
102. 196 F.2d at 683; see also Southern Saddlery Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 1205 (1950) ("[B]y main-
taining the intransigent position that it was financially unable to raise wages and, at the same 
time, by refusing to make any reasonable efforts to support or justify its position, [the employer] 
erected an insurmountable barrier to successful conclusion of the bargaining."); Pioneer Pearl 
Button Co., 1 N.L.R.B. 837, 843 (1936) (The employer "did no more than take refuge in the 
assertion that [its] financial condition was poor; [it] refused either to prove [its] statement, or to 
permit independent verification. This is not collective bargaining."). 
103. In other areas oflabor law intent is imputed to the employer when it should reasonably 
know the effects of its conduct will be contrary to the principles of the NLRA. In NLRB v. Erie 
Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963), in the context of employer discrimination against union 
members, the Supreme Court stated: "[The employer's] conduct does speak for itself - it is 
discriminatory and it does discourage union membership and whatever the claimed overriding 
justification may be, it carries with it unavoidable consequences which the employer not only 
foresaw but which he must have intended." 373 U.S. at 228 (emphasis in original). By imputing 
bad faith intent to an employer who refuses to substantiate its economic claims knowing that this 
refusal will hamper the negotiations, the incongruous result of looking to employer conduct 
rather than subjective intent is less unsettling. 
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IV. Goon FAITH BARGAINING REQUIRES SUBSTANTIATION OF 
COMPETITIVE DISADVANTAGE CLAIMS 
By deemphasizing the semantics of the employer's claim and fo-
cusing instead on the implications of the claim, the principles of good 
faith bargaining can be applied best. This is evident from an applica-
tion of the substantiation doctrine and the relevancy test. 
A. Good Faith Bargaining and the Substantiation Doctrine 
The concept of good faith bargaining, as espoused by the NLRB . 
and the courts, supports the rule that employers should have to sub-
stantiate competitive disadvantage claims or be guilty of bad faith bar-
gaining. There is little doubt that many reasons exist to explain why 
an employer might refuse to substantiate a competitive disadvantage 
claim with financial data other than the employer's subjective bad 
faith. 104 However, it is equally true that the effect of an employer's 
refusal to substantiate a competitive disadvantage claim interferes with 
the bargaining process to the same extent, as in Jacobs and Truitt, as a 
refusal to substantiate an inability-to-pay claim. In both cases, the re-
fusal to substantiate hinders the bargaining process because a union is 
unable to evaluate intelligently the employer's position. A union is in 
no better position to evaluate an employer's position or to determine 
that an employer's decision was reached in good faith when an em-
ployer responds to union demands in abstract terms of competition or 
economic harm than it is when an employer responds with an inabil-
ity-to-pay claim. The Harvstone rule allows an employer to take ref-
uge in a claim of competitive disadvantage to the same extent as an 
employer who claimed it was unable to pay a wage or benefit before 
Truitt was decided. As the court in Western Wirebound Box Co. 
noted: "In both cases, the give-and-take of collective bargaining is 
hampered and rendered ineffectual when an employer mechanically 
repeats his claim but makes no effort to produce substantiating 
data."105 
The Truitt substantiation doctrine should apply with full force to 
an employer's competitive disadvantage claim. If good faith bargain-
ing requires that an employer's claims be honest, and during negotia-
tions the employer has presented the union with a competitive 
disadvantage claim, then this implication of impending economic 
harm should be substantiated with financial information so the union 
can adequately assess the employer's position. 
Although an employer's claim of competitive disadvantage is not 
104. For example, an employer may be reluctant to disclose substantiating data because it 
does not want to impair its credit rating, engage in long discussions with union members who 
lack financial experience, or chance a leak to a competitor, or because it simply has a penchant 
for secrecy. Cox, supra note 88, at 1432. 
105. 356 F.2d at 91. 
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an assertion that it absolutely cannot pay a proposed wage or benefit, 
it does imply that paying the proposed wage or benefit will cause eco-
nomic harm to the employer. In Truitt, the Court emphasized that a 
relevant concern of the parties during labor negotiations was whether 
a company could pay a proposed wage or benefit without harm to its 
business: 
We think that in determining whether the obligation of good faith 
bargaining has been met the Board has a right to consider an employer's 
refusal to give information about its financial status .... In their effort to 
reach an agreement here both the union and the company treated the 
company's ability to pay increased wages as highly relevant. The ability 
of an employer to increase wages without injury to his business is a com-
monly considered factor in wage negotiations. Claims for increased 
wages have sometimes been abandoned because of an employer's unsatis-
factory business condition; employees have even voted to accept wage 
decreases because of such conditions.106 
Evidently, the Truitt Court was concerned with more than inabil-
ity-to-pay claims. The Court was concerned with any economic claim 
which suggested that paying a proposed wage or benefit would cause 
significant harm to (not just the demise of) the employer's business. 
This interpretation of Truitt eliminates the need to make the tenu-
ous argument that a competitive disadvantage claim is tantamount to 
an inability-to-pay claim.107 Certainly if an employer continues to op-
erate at a competitive disadvantage relative to its competition, it will 
ultimately be in a position to plead honestly an inability to pay.10s 
However, a competitive disadvantage claim does not assert a present 
inability to pay, 109 and it is better to insist on substantiation of an 
implication of future economic or competitive harm than to strain the 
meaning of a present inability-to-pay claim. 
B. The Relevancy Test 
It is unclear whether the Truitt Court grounded its holding on a 
relevancy determination.110 Ostensibly, the Truitt substantiation doc-
trine and the relevancy test are analytically distinct, 111 although ar-
guably the relevancy inquiry collapses into Truitt's substantiation 
doctrine. 112 In any event, application of the "relevancy" test supports 
106. 351 U.S. at 152 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
107. See supra section I.B.2. 
108. See Haro>Stone, 785 F.2d at 576-77. 
109. 785 F.2d at 577. 
110. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text. 
111. See Bartosic, supra note 9, at 47-49. 
112. As Professor Gorman noted: "[I]t is the company's assertion of poverty that makes [the 
substantiating financial information] relevant." GoRMAN, supra note 42, at 413; see also Puerto 
Rico Tel. Ca. v. NLRB, 359 F.2d 983, 987 (1st Cir. 1966) ("Clearly the data concerning volume 
of business, earnings, wage savings due to layoffs, etc., became relevant once the company raised 
the economic issue as the reason for the layoffs."); O'REILLY, supra note 29, at 49 ("Once the 
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the broad disclosure rule. 
From the inception of the NLRA, the NLRB has required an em-
ployer to provide information needed by the union for the proper per-
formance of its bargaining responsibilities. 113 The courts and the 
NLRB created a disclosure obligation under the aegis of the NLRA -
which is silent on the subject of disclosure - because it was clear that 
good faith collective bargaining could only be realized if both labor 
and management had the necessary information regarding the relevant 
issues of negotiation.114 Under the rule today, unless the information 
is wage data, 115 the union has the burden of explicating how the infor-
mation is relevant to the performance of its collective bargaining 
activities. 116 
Once an employer has made its financial position an issue by re-
sponding to a wage demand with a competitive disadvantage claim, it 
is hard to conceive of anything being more relevant to a union in for-
mulating its demands during collective bargaining than information 
about the extent of the employer's capacity to meet its wage 
demand. 117 
The Third Circuit recognized this reasoning in International Tele-
phone & Telegraph Corp. v. NLRB, 118 where the court applied the rele-
vancy test and required an employer to substantiate its competitive 
disadvantage claim. In this case, the employer maintained that for it 
to remain competitive, it had to lower the cost of fringe benefits be-
cause it was losing contracts to competitors. The union requested fi-
nancial data regarding the employer's competitive position and 
corresponding labor costs. 119 Enforcing the order of the NLRB, the 
court cited Truitt for the proposition that "[g]ood-faith bargaining re-
quires that relevant factual statements made during the course of col-
lective bargaining be supported, on request, by available proof as to 
employer has made a claim of inability to pay during negotiations, that claim establishes the 
pertinence of the corroborating data."). 
113. See, e.g., Aluminum Ore Co., 39 N.L.R.B. 1286, enforced, 131 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1942); 
see also Bartosic, supra note 9, at 24. 
114. See Shedlin, supra note 14, at 441-43. 
115. See supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
116. See supra note 13 and accompanying text; see also Bartosic, supra note 9, at 24. 
117. See SMITH, supra note 4, at 600 ("Could anything be more 'relevant' to a union in 
formulating its demands in preparation for collective bargaining than knowledge of the em-
ployer's capacity to pay?"). Shedlin argues that management-related information should be 
deemed relevant to mandatory subjects of bargaining: 
[T]he Board and courts should be willing to accept the argument that given the duty to 
bargain over a severance pay clause, the long-range prospects of the company are relevant 
and necessary to decide whether presently to bargain for severance pay or to seek an imme-
diate wage increase. Moreover, the union needs to know about ultimate plans for plant 
expansion or contraction because such plans are relevant to bargaining about seniority. 
Shedlin, supra note 14, at 455. 
118. 382 F.2d 366 (3d Cir. 1967), cert denied, 389 U.S. 1039 (1968). 
119. 382 F.2d at 370-71. 
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their accuracy" and found that the requested information was relevant 
to the union's function as a bargaining agent.120 The court then held 
that the employer's "failure to honor the request for disclosure of rele-
vant data in this case was a clear violation of [section 8(a)(5) and 
(1)]."121 
Given the importance of financial information when evaluating an 
employer's ability to meet a particular wage demand, the principles of 
good faith bargaining manifested in the substantiation doctrine and 
the relevancy test support the broad rule because, in the face of a com-
petitive disadvantage claim, the union needs substantiating financial 
information to perform properly its section 9(a) bargaining duties. Be-
yond the legal support for the broad rule, there are several practical 
advantages that would inure to the benefit of the NLRB, the courts, 
and the collective bargaining process. The next section discusses the 
advantages of the broad disclosure rule. 
V. THE ADVANTAGES OF THE BROAD DISCLOSURE RULE 
Applying the broad rule to require substantiation of competitive 
disadvantage claims would have several beneficial consequences with-
out interfering with the collective bargaining process. First, it would 
produce more efficient and less antagonistic labor negotiations by cre-
ating a beneficial flow of information between the negotiating parties. 
The free flow of information would allow the union, based on a realis-
tic appraisal of the employer's financial situation, to bargain for a rea-
sonable allocation of the employer's available resources. 122 For 
example, if a union is informed of an employer's fiscal situation and 
therefore is unable to ignore the problems of a struggling company, it 
may be willing to offer worker productivity increases in order to in-
crease the firm's earning power, enabling the firm to pay higher wages 
and still stay competitive.123 
The Supreme Court in Truitt emphasized that an informed union 
may be willing to capitulate on a proposed wage demand once the 
"unsatisfactory business condition" of the employer is made apparent 
to the union. 124 The Court referred to several then-contemporary ex-
amples of union capitulation.125 In the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
labor negotiations were marked by union wage concessions in the face 
120. 382 F.2d at 371. 
121. 382 F.2d at 371. For cases using a similar rationale, see cases cited supra note 42. 
122. Shedlin, supra note 14, at 452. 
123, See N. CHAMBERLAIN & J. KUHN, COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 369-70 (1965). Addi-
tionally, the union would be apprised of any danger that increased wages would lead to a substi-
tution of capital for labor. 
124. 351 U.S. at 152. 
125. 351 U.S. at 152 n.5 (citing, inter alia, Union Votes Wage Freeze to Aid Rice-Stix, St. 
Louis Globe-Democrat, Nov. 25, 1954, at l, col. 4; Studebaker Men Vote for Pay Cuts, N.Y. 
Times, Aug. 13, 1954, at 1, col. 5). 
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of a weak economy and employers besieged by foreign competition. 
For example, in 1979 the United Auto Workers (UAW), cognizant of 
the Chrysler Corporation's financial crisis, negotiated a contract with 
Chrysler which was less demanding than those subsequently reached 
with Ford and General Motors in order to facilitate a federal financial 
aid package which eventually saved Chrysler and the jobs of its work-
ers. By January 1981, the concessions granted by the UAW to 
Chrysler totaled $924 million.126 Similarly, in 1982, the UAW granted 
Ford and General Motors a series of concessions in order to abate the 
number of plant closings and to provide UAW members with more job 
security.127 The trucking128 and steel129 industries also won conces-
sions from unions because of the hard economic times. Indeed, of all 
collective bargaining agreements negotiated in 1983, approximately 
one third provided for an initial pay freeze or pay reduction. 130 It 
seems apparent from these examples that unions are willing to com-
promise their demands once they are made aware of their employers'' 
financial woes. 
The broad rule also eliminates the gamesmanship which is con-
trary to the statutory policy of cooperation and successful bargaining. 
An express purpose of the NLRA was to "encourag[e] practices fun-
damental to the friendly adjustment of industrial disputes arising out 
of differences as to wages, hours, or other working conditions .... " 131 
The Harvstone rule allows an employer essentially to take an inability-
to-pay position during the bargaining process and then later deny that 
it was in fact taking such a position because it skillfully avoided using 
the precise words "poverty" or "can't."132 This gamesmanship, char-
acterized by disingenuous claims, is hardly in accord with a spirit of 
cooperation and friendly resolution of differences. 
The broad rule would reduce this form of harmful gamesmanship 
by not allowing employers to hide their true intentions behind vague 
claims of competitive disadvantage. Specifically, an employer, rebuff-
ing a union demand, would have to be honest with the union and 
either give a reason unrelated to competition or economic harm or, if 
the reason for the rebuff is related to competition or economic harm, 
126. See ROTHSCHILD, supra note 3, at 41-43. 
127. Fraser, Collective Bargaining: A New Era of Breakthroughs in Job Security and Worker 
Participation, 14 U. ToL. L. REV. 255 (1983). See generally ROTHSCHILD, supra note 3, at 43-45. 
128. In 1982, the Teamsters agreed to a contract which provided for no general increase in 
wages. See ROTHSCHILD, supra note 3, at 46. 
129. In 1983, the United Steelworkers approved a contract that provided for a pay cut of 
$1.25/hour, eliminated one holiday and a week of vacation, reduced overtime, and reduced 
COLA payments. See ROTHSCHILD, supra note 3, at 48. 
130. Median Contract Settlement in 1983, 115 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) (Jan. 30, 1984) (Sum-
mary of Developments); ROTHSCHILD, supra note 3, at 49. 
131. 29 u.s.c. § 151 (1982). 
132. See Harvstone, 785 F.2d at 582 (Sywgert, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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provide the union with appropriate financial information supporting 
the claim. This would eliminate the guessing game created by ambigu-
ous claims where the union is left unclear about the employer's ability 
to meet the union's wage demands. 
Moreover, the broad rule would relieve the NLRB and the courts 
of the onerous judicial task of reviewing protracted negotiations to de-
termine whether or not the employer said "could not" as opposed to 
"would not." 133 Under the Harvstone rule, the NLRB or reviewing 
court must engage in a difficult factual review134 to determine the posi-
tion taken by the employer during negotiations. The court or the 
NLRB must engage in a difficult inquiry where, "[a]lthough no magic 
words are required to express an inability to pay, the words and con-
duct must be specific enough to convey such a meaning."135 
The broad rule would eliminate this expense of judicial time. In-
stead of having to decide whether a series of comments about competi-
tion amounts to an inability-to-pay stance, under the broad rule any 
employer response that suggests economic or competitive harm would 
trigger the disclosure obligation. Rather than having a "would not" I 
"could not" test, the broad rule would have a tighter "would not" I 
"could cause harm" test which leaves less room for employers to 
equivocate. For instance, in NLRB v. Celotex Corp., 136 the employer 
specifically denied it was claiming an inability to pay and stated to the 
union: "We can pay whatever we think is right to pay."137 However, 
the employer additionally made comments regarding the competitive-
ness and survival of one of its plants.138 The Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit enforced the NLRB's order that the employer disclose 
substantiating financial information. 139 Under the "would not" I 
"could not" test this is a difficult case because the employer specifi-
cally said it could afford the union's demand. It strains the meaning of 
the phrase "inability to pay" to characterize the Celotex employer as 
taking such a stance. On the other hand, under the broad rule this ,is 
an easy case because the employer clearly was trying to intimate that 
meeting the union's demand would cause it financial troubles. 
The broad rule also would remove the inconsistency and unpre-
133. See Harvstone, 785 F.2d at 575; see also J. O'REILLY, supra note 29, at so· ("Much of 
the litigation on disclosure of financial information has centered on whether ambiguous state-
ments in a bargaining context amount to a claim of inability to pay."). 
134. "As Justice Burger, then Circuit Judge, said ... , in the whole complex of industrial 
relations there are few issues less suited to appellate judicial appraisal than evaluation of bargain-
ing processes •... " Harvstone, 785 F.2d at 582 (Swygert, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
135. Harvstone, 785 F.2d at 575 (quoting ACL Corp., 271 N.L.R.B. 1600, 1602 (1984)). 
136. 364 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1966). 
137. 364 F.2d at 553 (quoting comment by company official during negotiations with union). 
138. 364 F.2d at 553. 
139. The court grounded its ruling on a relevancy determination. 364 F.2d at 554. See supra 
note 42. 
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dictability currently plaguing the courts. Under the Harvstone rule, 
the meaning of what an employer said is essentially determined by the 
meaning the NLRB or court chooses to give it. This open-ended test 
has allowed the NLRB and different courts to give different interpreta-
tions to very similar competitive disadvantage claims, creating incon-
sistent decisions. Under the Harvstone rule an employer may or may 
not have to substantiate a competitive disadvantage claim, depending 
on the political bent of the NLRB140 or the circuit precedent of the 
reviewing court. 
The broad rule would provide more consistency and predictability 
for two reasons. First, as demonstrated in the Celotex example, there 
is a clearer distinction between a "would not" claim and a "could 
cause harm" claim than there is between a "would not" claim and a 
"could not" claim. Thus, the disclosure consequences of bargaining 
claims would be clearer to employers, union representatives, the 
NLRB, and the courts. Second, and related to the first reason, be-
cause the broad rule leaves less room for employer equivocation, the 
NLRB and the courts would be required less often to interpret ambig-
uous employer claims which would reduce the frequency of disparate 
interpretations being given to similar language. 141 
An employer may be concerned that the broad rule would result in 
wholesale disclosure of financial data to unions. However, this con-
cern is unwarranted because the employer would still control the trig-
ger for the disclosure obligation. For example, a financially healthy 
employer, ·predisposed against disclosure, could avoid disclosing its fi-
nancial information by responding to a union wage demand with the 
explanation that the union's price is more than the employer is willing 
to pay. 142 A financially languid employer, with the same predisposi-
140. Under the Reagan administration, for example, the NLRB rejected its previous view 
that a claim of competitive disadvantage was ipso facto a claim of inability to pay. Harvstone, 785 
F.2d at 575 n.4. 
141. See supra section J.B. 
142. Of course this "unwillingness" response also could be repeated mechanically. However, 
the precepts of good faith bargaining would require some elaboration on the reasons underlying 
the employer's unwillingness. An employer could articulate several reasons besides economic 
harm for its unwillingness to meet union demands which would not require substantiation under 
the broad rule. For instance, an employer could assert a desire to reinvest profit in new equip· 
ment or advertising to ensure continued growth. The employer could also express a desire to 
maintain a particular profit margin or fashion of life style to which the employer has become 
accustomed. See Milbin Printing Inc., 218 N.L.R.B. 223 (1975). Although these claims would 
require some form of substantiation, it would be less than that required by a competitive disad· 
vantage claim. For example, in Dallas General Drivers, Local Union No. 745, 355 F.2d 842 
(D.C. Cir. 1966), the employer claimed that it would not grant the union's wage increase demand 
because it was already paying wages in excess of the prevailing rates of its competition in the 
same labor market. 355 F.2d at 845. The NLRB and the Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia Circuit construed the employer's claim not to be an inability-to-pay claim. Under the 
broad rule, the result would be the same because the employer did not suggest that paying the 
higher wage would cause economic or competitive harm. For instance, the employer may not 
want to raise wages out of principle. However, if pressured for an explanation, it would be 
incumbent on the employer to explain the reason for its reluctance to raise wages. If the em· 
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tion, could employ the same tactics, or it may decide that docu-
menting its financial situation to the union would expedite union 
capitulation.143 In short, the extent of disclosure rests in the hands of 
the employer. Rather than result in a wholesale disclosure of financial 
information to unions, the broad rule would result in more candid ne-
gotiations because an employer would no longer be able to make stra-
tegic use of ambiguous claims of impending economic harm. 
Additionally, an employer may be concerned that the broad rule 
would compromise an employer's confidentiality concerns or be un-
duly burdensome to the bargaining process. However, the NLRB and 
the courts recognize several reasons for not requiring an employer to 
disclose relevant information, 144 and these would still be available to 
employers. For instance, if an employer could show that the reason 
behind the union's request for substantiating financial information is 
to harass or publicly embarrass the employer, then the NLRB or court 
may not require disclosure. 145 The employer would not be required to 
disclose the financial information in the exact manner or form re-
quested by the union as long as the employer's objection is meritori-
ous, 146 and the alternative mode of conveying the information 
communicates the essence of the substantiating financial data. 147 
Although, as a general rule, an employer's confidentiality objection 
will not be sustained, 148 if an employer can establish that it has a legiti-
mate business interest in preserving confidentiality, the courts and the 
NLRB will generally attempt to strike a balance between the interests 
of the union and the employer and fashion a suitable disclosure 
scheme. 149 
Perhaps the best way to allay skepticism about the broad disclo-
sure rule is to look at the broad disclosure rules mandated by statutes 
in other industrial countries. For instance, Great Britain, West Ger-
many, and Belgium impose, by statute, an affirmative duty on employ-
ers to diselose a broad range of information. 150 IIi Great Britain, 
under the Employment Protection Act of 1975 and the British Code of 
Practice on Disclosure of Information to Trade Unions for Collective 
Bargaining Purposes, 151 an employer must disclose information in the 
ployer were to explain its reluctance in terms of feared economic or competitive harm then the 
broad rule would mandate some form of substantiation with financial information. 
143. See supra notes 124-30 and accompanying text. 
144. See generally GORMAN, supra note 42, at 415-18. 
145. See NLRB v. Robert S. Abbot Publishing Co., 331 F.2d 209, 212 (7th Cir. 1964). 
146. See Emeryville Research Center v. NLRB, 441 F.2d 880, 885-86 (9th Cir. 1971). 
147. See General Elec. Co., 186 N.L.R.B. 14, 17 (1970). 
148. See Curtis-Wright Corp. v. NLRB, 347 F.2d 61, 71 (3d Cir. 1965). 
149. See Kroger Co. v. NLRB, 399 F.2d 455 (6th Cir. 1968). 
150. See generally Shedlin, supra note 14, at 456-60. 
151. Advisory, Conciliation, & Arbitration Service, Code of Practice 2 (1977) (discussed in 
Shedlin, supra note 14, at 456-57) [hereinafter Code of Practice]. 
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areas of pay and benefits, condition of service, manpower, perfor-
mance, and finances. 152 This information goes well beyond informa-
tion regarded as "presumptively relevant" by the NLRB.153 
The Works Council, 154 under West German law,155 must be in-
formed by employers about planned changes in working areas, proce-
dures, routines, technical facilities, and jobs.156 Additionally, the 
Works Council must be given information on personnel planning, in-
cluding current and future personnel demands.157 Every company 
with more than one hundred employees must establish an Economic 
Committee (Wirtschaftsausschuss) to consult the employer on financial 
matters and to report to the Works Council. 158 The Economic Com-
mittee must be furnished with detailed information relating to the em-
ployer's economic and financial situation; production and sales figures; 
investment programs; new manufacturing methods; any reduction or 
shutdown of production; any relocation or merger; and various other 
information that is material to the employees' interests.159 
The laws of Belgium require vast disclosure to a council similar to 
West Germany's Works Council.160 The council is composed of rep-
resentatives of both management and labor, and serves to review and 
establish policies relating to employee welfare. 161 Employers must dis-
close information including the company's market position, financial 
structure, personnel expenses, budget, production costs, and the em-
ployer's assessment of the company's future. 162 Additionally, the em-
ployers must furnish quarterly reports163 and independently inform 
the council of events or decisions of consequence to the company.164 
Thus, as the examples of other countries illustrate, the disclosure 
152. Code of Practice, supra note 151, ~ 11. 
153. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text. 
154. In West Germany, a major player in worker representation is an institution called the 
Betriebsrat or Works Council, which is distinct from but closely associated with the labor unions. 
See Shedlin, supra note 14, at 458. 
155. See Law of Jan. 15, 1972, § 80(1), Bundesgesetzblatt I 13, 29 [hereinafter Law of Jan. 
15, 1972) (outlining the duties of the Works Council). 
156. Law of Jan. 15, 1972, supra note 155, at § 90. 
157. Law of Jan. 15, 1972, supra note 155, at § 92(1). 
158. Law of Jan. 15, 1972, supra note 155, at § 106(1). 
159. Law of Jan. 15, 1972, supra note 155, at § 106(2), (3). However, the duty to disclose 
only exists if disclosure would not endanger the employer's technological and business secrets. 
Id. at § 106(2). 
160. See Decree of Nov. 27, 1973, chs. 1-2, 3 Les Codes Larcier 310 (1975) [hereinafter 
Decree of Nov. 27, 1973). 
161. The council in Belgium, called the consei/ d'entreprise, comprises at least two employee 
representatives, plus an equal number of substitute representatives, and the employer, plus one or 
more of the employer's representatives and their substitutes. See J.-P. DE BANT, CCH BUSINESS 
GUIDE TO BELGIUM~ 807 (1978). 
162. Decree of Nov. 27, 1973, supra note 160, at ch. 2, art. 4. 
163. Decree of Nov. 27, 1973, supra note 160, at ch. 4, art. 24. 
164. Decree of Nov. 27, 1973, supra note 160, at ch. 5, art. 25. 
June 1989] Note - Competitive Disadvantage Claims 2055 
of management-related information is workable and 1does not result in 
catastrophic consequences. 
CONCLUSION 
By forbidding an employer to hide its true intentions behind claims 
couched in terms of competition, the ideal of full and fair presentation 
of pertinent issues in collective bargaining can be more readily 
achieved. The case law demonstrates that some courts, and at times 
the NLRB, have abandoned the good faith inquiry by applying a nar-
row construction of Truitt, which ignores the importance of having 
appropriate financial information when evaluating an employer's abil-
ity to pay a particular wage demand. Once the importance of financial 
information is recognized, an application of the substantiation doc-
trine and the relevancy test reveals that good faith bargaining pre-
cludes an employer from taking refuge in a claim of competitive 
disadvantage without offering substantiating data. In addition to mak-
ing legal sense, the broad rule would foster more cooperative collective 
bargaining and more consistent and predictable decisions, and would 
eliminate the need for an onerous review of labor negotiations - with-
out jeopardizing employers' confidentiality concerns. 
- Brandon David Lawniczak 
